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The aim of the article is to investigate the impact of commercialisation on household 
poverty  in  Malawi  using  the  1997/98  Integrated  Household  Survey  data.  The  results 
indicate that overall those household who were more commercialised were better off than 
those  who  did  not  and  thus  commercialisation  should  be  encouraged  as  a  means  of 
alleviating poverty. In terms of regional analysis the southern region and the central 
region results indicate that the more commercialised households were actually worse off. 
Furthermore, the livelihoods of the most vulnerable households (female headed and poor 
households) did not benefit from commercialisation. Therefore, in terms of policies, it is 
important  that  government  should  identify  groups  that  are  likely  losers  to 
commercialisation and hence the need for compensatory or socially protective policy 
design  to  socio-economic  groups  whose  incomes  have  been  reduced  by 
commercialisation.   
 
Keywords: 
Commercialisation, Poverty, Propensity Score Matching, Household Model, Malawi. 
 
JEL classification: C31, I31, Q12    2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Malawi  is  one  of  the  first  countries  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  to  adopt  the  structural 
adjustment programmes following an economic crisis in the late 1970s that manifested in 
negative growth rates in gross domestic product in 1980 and 1981. Most macroeconomic 
policies  under  the  structural  adjustment  programme  focused  on  liberalisation  of 
international  and  domestic  trade  including  liberalisation  of  agricultural  prices  and 
marketing, removal of agricultural subsidies, reduction in trade tariffs and removal of non 
tariff barriers to trade, liberalisation of the exchange rate system, liberalisation of the 
financial sector and interest rates and provision of investment incentives.  Among other 
things,  these  reforms  were  expected  to  raise  the incomes  of  smallholder  farmers  and 
hence increase their entitlement to food through the market. Even though these reforms 
have been in line with the general trend in the development discourse which is in favour 
of  commercialisation,  how  well  it  works  in  different  contexts  depends  on  the 
characteristics of the households, potential of the local market as well as the legal and 
political framework in which the commercialisation is to take place. 
 
Furthermore, the success of further commercialisation in relieving poverty depends on 
how well the households are currently integrated in the market and to what extent the 
opportunities provided by specialisation have already been exploited. This article aims at 
providing  evidence  of  the  magnitude  and  nature  of  the  welfare  impact  of 
commercialisation in Malawi.  
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The central hypothesis is that increased participation in trade at the local market is likely 
to increase consumer/producer surplus for the participating household and thus increase 
the household’s welfare. Hence, agricultural market participation is likely to increase the 
consumption level of the household thorough increased levels of trade.  
 
The question that comes to the fore after considering the above issues is as follows; what 
has been the impact of commercialisation on poverty? Another related questions is, are 
there any biases in the distribution of benefits to different groups, and if so, what are the 
sources of these? The purpose of this paper therefore is to answer the above questions.  
 
The  article  is  structured  along  six  main  sections.  In  Section  2,  we  review  the  links 
between commercialisation and poverty. We lay the theoretical framework and empirical 
strategy in section 3. The econometrics is discussed in section 4 while section 5 presents 
results of the analysis. Lastly, conclusions and policy implications are presented in the 
section 6 of the article.  
 
2. COMMERCIALISATION AND POVERTY  
 
This section sketches a framework for thinking through the effects of commercialisation 
on household poverty (Figure 1). Poverty as a characteristic of households or individuals 
is defined in terms of a predetermined minimum level of real income (or consumption), 
and  is  measured  in  terms  of  the  numbers  of  people  who  live  below  this  minimum   4 
(headcount poverty).  Commercialisation is likely to cause beneficial outcomes through 
several links. 
 
        [Figure 1 around here] 
 
First is the subsistence food channel. The reduction of transaction cost creates a stronger 
price incentive for a producer to engage in trade. The access to markets and effective 
transportation networks would lead to an increased number of suppliers. This increase in 
suppliers  leads  to  more  reliable  supply  of  food  crops  and  less  volatile  prices  at  the 
markets. One effect of this is the lowering of the risk involved in trade which would then 
allow  otherwise  risk-avert  and  vulnerable  households  to  specialise  and  benefit  from 
selling cash crops as well as consuming larger variety of goods acquired from the market.  
 
The  second  link  between  commercialisation  and  poverty  is  through  the  employment 
market. Commercialisation of agriculture leads to a substantial expansion of demand for 
hired labour, which contributes to the income earning possibilities of poor households. 
This employment link allows households to increase their purchase of food items and non 
food items which leads to improved household welfare. 
 
The final link is through the market surplus. Commercialisation does not only relate to 
selling  cash  crops  but  commercialisation  of  food  crops  is  also  an  important  part  of 
enhanced livelihoods in poor households. Usually production for the market is only done 
when the household’s basic demand for food has been ensured. It is the surplus that is   5 
marketed.  Either  way,  whether  it  is  cash  crops  or  surplus  food  crops, when  they  are 
marketed they provide the household with income which enhances household welfare.  
 
It is however important to note that the way in which these possible increased welfare of 
the household finally translates into increased welfare of the individuals depends on the 
decision making process within the household. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
In this article the term commercialisation is used based on the definition by Braun & 
Kennedy (1994) who defined commercialisation as the market integration of household 
economy so that larger part of consumption is acquired through market transactions, as 
such our commercialisation variable is defined as a proportion of the consumption that is 
bought from the market, i.e. as a proportion bound between 0 and 1. This takes the value 
1, if a household derive over 50 per cent of its income from cash agriculture and 0 for a 
household who derive over 50 per cent of its income from own consumption.  In our 
analysis commercialisation is equated to participation in market agriculture on the basis 
of 50 per cent cut off point.  
 
The analysis of whether participation in any programme enhances the livelihood of rural 
people  can  be  formulated  in  the  framework  of  Roy’s  (1951)  self-selection  model 
developed to explain occupational choice and its consequences for the distribution of 
income.  Like  Roy’s  model  where  individuals  choose  between  fishing  and  hunting   6 
depending on their endowments in occupation-specific skills, our model assumes that 
households decide either to engage in cash market agriculture (participation) or not (non-
participation) based on utility maximisation. For each household  , ,... 1 , N h h =  let  jh U  be 
the utility associated with each decision  h J  where  J Jh ∈  is an indicator variable so that 
(1,0) j =  representing the decision to either participate or not, respectively. We assume 
that total utility is a function of daily per capita household expenditure associated with 
each alternative so that total utility is given by:  
 
h h j jh jh ej z y U + + = δ α ) (ln               (1) 
 
where  jh y ln  represents the natural log of per capita household expenditure,  i z  represent 
all other background factors that relate observed factors to total utility.  jh e  is a random 
component which captures other unobserved factors that affect total utility, α and  h δ are 
unknown  parameters.  We  assume  that  the  criterion  on  which  households  make  their 
choices  is  by  comparing  utility  associated  with  each  alternative.  Let 
*
h V   denotes  the 
difference in utility between two choices which can be expressed as: 
 
h h h h h h h e z y y U U V − − − = − = δ α ) ln (ln 0 1 0 1
*         (2) 
 
where  h h h e e e 0 1 − = and  0 1 δ δ δ − = .  Although  the  difference  in  utility  cannot  be 
observed, the decision taken by a household is observed as a binary outcome such that: 
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1 = ∈ j Jh  if  0
* > h V and  0 = j  otherwise           (3) 
 
Other things being equal, equation (3) indicates that households choose to participate in 
the programme only if the utility from participation is higher than the alternative, non-
participation.  We therefore assume that the difference between expected daily per capita 
household expenditure associated with each alternative is a key decision variable that 
influences  household  participation  decisions.  Assuming  that  this  daily  per  capita 
household expenditure varies among households depending on their participation status 
and  differences  in  observable  characteristics h h h z x x ∈ = ,  expenditure  equations 
associated with each alternative can be written as:  
h h h x y 1 1 1 1 ln ε σ β + =  if  1 = j              (4a) 
h h h x y 0 0 0 0 ln ε σ β + =  if  0 = j             (4b) 
where  h y0 ln and  h y1 ln  denote the natural log of daily per capita household expenditure 
associated with participation and non-participation, respectively. 1 0  and  β β  are unknown 
parameters,  1 0  and  σ σ are  standard  deviations.  h 1 ε   and  h 0 ε   are  the  error  terms  with 
0 ) | ( = h h j x E ε   
 
Our aim is to establish if indeed commercialisation enhances household expenditures in 
Malawi.  If  daily  per  capita  household  expenditure  for  all  participants  were  recorded 
before commercialisation and if households were randomly selected into the programme,   8 
the impact of the programme would be estimated by simply taking the difference between 
mean expenditures before and after the programme, i.e.: 
 
h h h y y ATE 0 1 ln ln ) ( − = π               (5) 
such that  ) (ATE h π  would be a measure of the impact of commercialisation . A common 
problem in programme evaluation is the missing data problem where outcomes (i.e., daily 
per capita household expenditure) for households are observed for only one state and no 
information  in  the  counterfactual  state  is  available.  Using  average  daily  per  capita 
household  expenditure  for  non-participants  to  estimate  the  average  treatment  effect 
(ATE) in absence of the counterfactual outcome data for participants would bias the true 
impact of the programme due to endogeneity and sample selection biases. From equations 
(4a) and (4b), the observed outcome is expressed as:  
 
) ( ) )( 1 ( ln ln ) 1 ( ln 1 1 1 0 0 0 h h h h h h h x j x j y j y j y ε σ β ε σ β + + + − = + − =   (6) 
 
This shows that participation is endogenously determined. Given the selection criterion in 
equation  (3),  the  conditional  expectation  of  household  expenditure  associated  with 
decision  j Jh ∈  can be expressed as: 
 
  ) | ( ) 1 , | (ln 1 1 1 1 h h h h h h z E x j x y E γ ε ε σ β − > + = =         (7a) 
) | ( ) 0 , | (ln 0 0 0 0 h h h h h h z E x j x y E γ ε ε σ β − < + = =         (7b)   9 
 
where  h ε is  the  error  term  for  selection  (participation)  equation,  h z   is  a  vector  of 
variables that determine participation decision and γ  is a vector of unknown parameters. 
The  terms  ) | ( 1 h h h z E γ ε ε − > and  ) | ( 0 h h h z E γ ε ε − < in  equations  (7a)  and  (7b) 
respectively are non-constants due to correlation between the error terms of the selection 
(participation) and outcome (expenditure) equations.  
 
This correlation arises because it is impossible to observe a household with and without 
programme  participation  simultaneously,  and  lacking  a  panel  data  set  that  allows 
observation of households before and after programme participation, impact analysis in 
this article is based on comparing household outcomes differentiated by participation in 
market agriculture (commercialisation) while simultaneously controlling for various other 
factors that affect the outcome in question (for example, levels of prior owned human and 
physical  capital).  However,  not  all  of  the  “other  factors”  can  be  measured  or  even 
observed. For example, in Malawi many farmers reveal a strong preference to secure food 
needs  before  engaging  in  market  agriculture.  This  behaviour  is  probably  affected  by 
issues of risk aversion, know how and lack of insurance. Traditional agriculture may be 
the consequence of risk aversion, but may be related to know how and lack of insurance, 
other factors such rainfall and soil quality differences, innate abilities, entrepreneurship, 
social  skills,  and  management  abilities  make  some  households  more  productive  than 
others, but these cannot be fully observed or adequately measured. If these same factors 
also affect a household’s participation in market agriculture, selectivity bias results and 
attribution becomes difficult (Heckman 1979). As reported in Morduch (1997), this type   10 
of selection bias can lead to an overestimation of impact by as much as 100 percent 




4.1 The data 
 
This  article  uses  data  from  the  1997–98  Malawi  Integrated  Household  Survey  (IHS) 
conducted  by  the  National  Statistical  Office  (NSO).  The  survey  was  administered  to 
12,960 households over a 12-month period. In rural areas, a three-stage sample selection 
process was used, consisting of the traditional authority (TA), the sub district spatial unit, 
as the first stage and enumeration areas (EA) within the TA as the second stage. Roughly, 
one  TA  was  selected  for  every  50,000  households  in the  stratum.  Twelve  EAs  were 
selected  in  each  selected  TA.  Both  TAs  and  EAs  were  selected  with  probability  of 
selection  proportional  to  population  size.  Twenty  households  were  randomly  selected 
within  the  selected  EAs  as  the  third  stage  of  rural  sample  selection.  All  selected 
households in an EA were interviewed in the same calendar month. Interviewing was 
carried out in each of the 12 selected EAs in a TA in turn through the 12 months of the 
survey year in order to capture seasonal variation. The questionnaire was administered in 
two parts. The first was a large questionnaire that was administered to the respondent 
household  in  a  single  visit.  This  consisted  of  approximately  a  dozen  modules  on 
household composition, educational attainment, health and nutritional status, agriculture,   11 
home-produced and purchased consumption items, assets, and so on. The second part was 
a diary of expenditure.  
 
4.2 Analytical Framework 
 
In  this  section  we  discuss  the  analytical  framework  that  informs  the  econometric 
estimation  of  commercialisation  and  poverty.    The  article  uses  the  Propensity  Score 
Matching (PSM), this method has been used in recent times to evaluate the impact of 
various programmes (Bryson et al., 2002; Heckman et al., 1999). Rosenbaun & Rubin 
(1983) showed that it is possible to use a base set of covariates to predict the likelihood 
than a household will participate in commercialisation (p(X)) using logit, probit, or some 
other method. This is known as the propensity score and is measured on a unit scale (1 
being treated, 0 being the untreated or control). These propensity scores are used to match 
treatment group households with control group households. The difference in per capita 
household expenditure can then be compared by groups of matched data, and the average 
treatment effect (ATE) can be calculated. 
 
Conditioning on propensity scores was shown to reduce selection bias by Rosenbaun & 
Rubin (1983) and the method has since been used to analyse various issues-from effect of 
treatment on medical outcomes (Imbens 2000; D’Agostino 1998) to the effect of fertility 
on marital dissolution (Vuri 2001). It has also been a growing part of the analysis on 
labour  markets  (Sianesi,  2004;  Lechner,  2002;  Bryson  et  al.,  2002;  Heckman,  1997; 
Heckman et al., 1999; Hirsch & Mehay, 2002; Angrist & Kruger, 1999, Smith & Todd,   12 
2005; Dehejia & Wahba, 1999, 2002; and Dehejia, 2005) and other evaluation economic 
issues  like  globalisation  (Balat  &  Porto,  2005)  and  in  other  economic  evaluations 
(Heckman et al., 1998; Blundell & Dias, 2002; Heckman & Navarro-Lozano, 2003).  
 
The propensity score works because if treatment and control groups are similar in X, then 
there are no selective differences in the outcome of interest between  the two  groups 
(Heckman  et  al.,  1999).  Propensity  score  matching  has  added  bonus  of  being  more 
convenient  than  other  methods  e.g.  instrumental  variables  since  they  condition  the 
analysis  on  only  the  variables  thought  to  influence  the  outcome,  and  do  not  require 
additional variables. 
 
The  aim  is  to  determine  whether  household  expenditure  for  participants  in  market 
agriculture  (a  proxy  for  commercialisation),  especially  for  female-headed  and  poor 
households has improved or dropped due to commercialisation. 
 
To assess the impact of commercialisation, we apply matching methods on per capita 
household expenditure for participant households and non-participant households. The 
idea behind matching is to create randomness in programme assignment on assertion that 
if untreated households (non-participants) have the same probability of participation as 
treated households (participants), then average per capita household expenditure for non-
participants is a good approximation of what participants would have earned had they not 
participated  in  the  programme.  The  difference  in  average  per  capita  household 
expenditure between the two groups, referred to as the ‘average treatment effect’ would   13 
therefore yield unbiased estimates of the gross gains to participants from the programme 
(Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). Thus, our parameter of interest is: 
  
  ) 1 | ln (ln ) 1 , | ( 0 1 = − ≡ = j y y E J z E h h h ATEh π         (12) 
 
where  ) 1 , | ( = j z E h ATEh π  is the average treatment effect,   h y1  and  h y0  are the per capita 
household  expenditures  of  participant  households  and  non  participants  households 
respectively. 
 
According to Smith & Todd (2005), using conditioning variables to identify control units 
(non-participants) to match with the treated units (participants) becomes difficult if the 
number of variables zh is large with different dimensions, some being continuous and 
others discrete, referred to as the ‘curse of dimensionality’. To address this problem, 
Rosenbaum  &  Rubin  (1983)  showed  that  if  outcomes  (e.g.,  per  capita  household 
expenditure) are independent of participation conditional on  h z , then they (outcomes) are 
also  independent  conditional  on  the  propensity  score,  ( ) p z .  This  implies  that 
) ( ) | ( | 1 Pr( z p z J E z j h h h ≡ = =  such that: 
) ( , , , , 0 1 0 1 z p J y y z J y y h h h ⊥ ⇒ ⊥  
where  ( ) p z has lower and upper bounds  1 ) ( 0 < < z p . This assumption reduces the multi-
dimension of conditioning variables to a single index, the propensity score with which 
matching can be performed. However, Imbens (2000) suggests that a weaker assumption   14 
of untreated outcome (i.e., per capita household expenditure for non-participants) being 
independent  conditional  on  covariates  zh  and  therefore  on  the  propensity  score  ( ) p z  
[ ] ) 1 | ( )) ( | ( , 0 ., . 0 0 0 = ≅ ⇒ = ⊥ j y E z p y E z j y e i h h h  suffices to identify the distribution of 
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where  ) ( ˆ ATE π  is the expected value of the programme effect which is the average over 
a region of common support of  h z denoted as  z s  and  z F  is the density of  h z . This makes 
it  possible  to  compare  per  capita  household  expenditure  for  participants  and  non-
participants with different values of  h z but having the same propensity score ( ) p z . The 
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h h y c t w n z p j y E ,  1 0  and  n n   denote  number  of  participants 
and non-participants within a region of common support  z s .  (.) w  is a weighting function 
that  depends  on  the  distance  between  the  propensity  score  for  participants  and  non-
participants. From equation (13), a match for each participant household  z s t h ∩ ∈  is 
constructed  as  a  weighted  average  over  per  capita  household  expenditure  for  non-
participants with the same propensity score as participants (see, Smith & Todd, 2005).   15 
 
For empirical application, four matching estimators are used, namely, nearest neighbor, 
radius,  kernel  and  stratification  matching.  The  nearest  neighbour  matching  involves 
estimating  the  difference  in  average  per  capita  household  expenditure  between 
participants and non-participants having the closest propensity score as for participants. 
We implement nearest neighbour matching with replacement to minimise asymptotic 
bias by allowing non-participants to be matched with more than one participant. The 
‘average  treatment  effect’  is  calculated  as  the  difference  between  average  per  capita 
household expenditure for participants and non-participants. Radius matching is similar 
to nearest neighbour matching except that participants are matched with non-participants 
within  0.1  radius  of  the  propensity  score  for  participants.  With  Kernel  matching,  all 
participants are matched against a weighted average for all non-participants with weights 
that are inversely proportional to the distance between propensity scores for participants 
and non-participants. Finally stratification matching involves dividing the sample into 
different intervals of the propensity score. Within each interval or block, participants and 
non-participants have the same average propensity score. The difference in the average 
per capita household expenditure between the two groups is estimated for each block and 
the  overall  average  income  is  computed  using  weights  based  on  the  distribution  of 
participants across all blocks. For details see Abadie et al., (2001), Dehejia & Wahba 
(2002) and Becker & Ichino (2002). 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.1 Sources of Household Income 
 
This section begins with a description of the sources of income.  This is important for two 
reasons. First, by affecting wages and cash agricultural income, trade opportunities are 
likely to have large impacts on household resources and on poverty. As argued by Deaton 
(1997) and others, the short-run effects of price changes can be assessed by looking at 
income  shares.  Secondly,  the  description  of  income  shares  is  also  useful  because  it 
highlights the main channels through which trade opportunities can have an impact on 
household income. 
 
Table 1 reports the average income shares for different sources of income. At the national 
level, the main sources of income are income from home consumption (43.1  per cent), 
and  wages  (28.2    per  cent).  Regarding  agricultural  income,  the  sale  of  cash  crops 
accounts for 5.1 percent of total income, while the sale of livestock and products account 
1.3 percent of household income. 
 
There  are  important  differences  in  income  sources  between  poor  and  non-poor 
households. While the share of own-production is over half of the total (55.9 per cent) in 
the average poor household, it is less than half (38.1 per cent) in non-poor households. In 
contrast, while wages account for 30.9 per cent of the total income of the non-poor, they 
account for only 21.5 per cent of the income of the poor. The shares of the income   17 
generated in non-farm businesses are 2.3 per cent and 10.5 per cent in poor and non-poor 
households respectively.  
 
It is interesting to compare the different sources of income across the regions. In rural 
areas (southern, central and northern region), for instance, the percent of total income 
accounted for by own-production ranges from 36.0 per cent to 49.6 per cent; the share in 
urban areas is only 4.3 per cent. The share of non-farm income in rural areas is between 
1.4 per cent in the northern region and 16.9 per cent in the southern region, which should 
be compared with a 21.4 per cent in urban  areas.  In urban areas, in contrast, wages 
account  for  over  half  (55.8  per  cent)  of  household  income,  and  the  contribution  of 
agricultural activities is much smaller.  
 
The results indicate that in rural areas, households derive most of their income from 
subsistence agricultural and agricultural wage employment. Cash crop activities and non 
farm activities comprise a smaller fraction of total household income.  
 
    [Table 1 around here] 
 
5.2 Average Household Budget Shares 
 
In order to investigate some of the consumption effects of commercialisation in Malawi, 
Table 2 reports the average budget shares spent by Malawian households in different 
goods. As expected, most of the budget was spent on food, with a national average share   18 
of 61.5 per cent. The average was higher in rural areas (ranging from 59.2 per cent to 
65.0 per cent) and lower in urban areas (35.2 per cent).  
 
Further, the poor spent a larger share of total expenditure on food than the non-poor. At 
the national level, for instance, 76.0 per cent of the total expenditure of an average poor 
household was devoted to food, while for non-poor households the average was 55.4 per 
cent. Other goods accounting for a significant share of total expenditure were clothing, 
housing and gifts, transfers or loans. However, these average shares were always below 
10 per cent. The usual differences between urban and rural households and between the 
poor and the non-poor were observed. For instance, differences between the poor and non 
poor in expenditures other than food depends largely on the region of residence. The 
patterns are more diverse for the non-poor households than poor households in both rural 
(southern, central and northern regions) and the urban areas. In the rural areas, the non 
poor have proportionately larger expenditures for clothing, housing and gifts. In urban 
areas, the non poor households spend more on education, housing, travel and gifts. The 
urban  non  poor  households,  fuels  account  for  a  greater  proportion  of  household 
expenditure than their non poor counterparts. Another observation from this table is that 
on average expenditure levels for urban households are double the levels of in rural areas, 
reflecting differences in cost of living between the rural and the urban areas. 
 
There is one fundamental lesson that can be learnt from Table 2. In Malawi, as in many 
low income developing countries, the largest fraction of household expenditure is spent 
on food. In consequence, the largest impacts of trade policies and economic reforms on   19 
the consumption side will be caused by changes in the prices of food items. Expenditures 
on other non-food items are relatively less important in terms of total expenditure, the 
welfare impacts being lower as a result. 
 
    [Table 2 around here]  
 
5.3 Absolute and relative household per capita expenditure 
 
Table  3  presents  absolute  and  relative  estimates  of  per  capita  household  expenditure 
differential  for  different  groups.  The  average  expenditure  for  participating  and  non 
participating households in commercialisation is reported in the first and second column 
respectively.  The  third  column  displays  the  difference  between  average  per  capita 
household  expenditure  for  participating  and  non  participating  households  and  the  t-
statistics (in brackets) testing the null hypothesis that the mean difference is zero. The 
fourth  column  presents  relative  percentage  change  in  average  per  capita  household 
expenditure between the two groups. 
 
If the average daily per capita household expenditure for non participating households 
were accurate estimates of what the participating households would earn had they not 
participated in market agriculture, negative figures from last column in Table 1 would 
imply significant reductions in daily per capita household expenditure for participating 
households.   From the table it can be seen that for the whole sample the results are highly 
significant  at  1  per  cent  level.  This  means  that  daily  per  capita  expenditure  for   20 
participants  would  increase  by  17  per  cent.  In  terms  of  regional  differences,  it  is 
important to note that the only the results from the southern region are not significant, 
indicating that commercialisation had no impact on households in the southern region. 
These  results  suggest  that  commercialisation  would  enhance  the  daily  per  capita 
household expenditure for the central, northern and urban regions.  
 
    [Table 3 around here] 
 
The per capita household expenditure for participating households in the central region 
would increase by 7 per cent, while those in the northern region would be enhanced by 
about 18 per cent and the highest benefits would be in the urban areas where the expected 
benefit  from  commercialisation  would  be  an  increase  in  daily  per  capita  household 
expenditure of participating households by over 50 per cent. Among the poor households, 
commercialisation  would  actually  reduce  daily  per  capita  household  expenditure  for 
participating households by 13 per cent, while female headed participating households 
would sacrifice 12 per cent of their expenditure.  
 
In general raw data presented above seem to indicate that participants benefit more from 
commercialisation  than  non  participating  households.  While  this  may  imply  that 
commercialisation is conducive to enhance expenditures for participating households, it 
also indicates that the benefits are not always positive for all groups. Nonetheless, using 
average daily per capita household expenditures to make inferences about the impact of   21 
commercialisation may be flawed due to counterfactual problems since we do not have 
data for before and after the event.  
 
 The  results  from  the  propensity  score  matching  estimates  of  the  effect  of 
commercialisation on poverty are presented in Table 4. Because of the different matching 
methods used, different sample sizes are used for each of the estimates and the different 
matching  methods  can  be  considered  a  sensitivity  analysis  of  the  propensity  score 
matching  overall.  All  estimates  are  based  on  the  common  support  and  satisfy  the 
balancing requirement.  
 
    [Table 4 around here] 
 
Table 4 indicates that estimates of average treatment effects are consistently positive and 
not statistically significant across sub samples suggesting that commercialisation does not 
generate  beneficial  outcomes  to  participating  households.  In  general,  the  sizes  of  the 
estimates from different matching estimates are different. As noted by Smith & Todd 
(2005), results from the different methods are sensitive to the set of variables used in the 
propensity scores as well as the sample used in estimating the average treatment effect. In 
other words, the results are sensitive to the matching method used. 
 
From  the  table,  only  estimates  from  the  radius  matching  method  are  statistically 
significant while those from the rest of the matching methods are not significant and the 
estimates from the nearest neighbour method are negative. In general, estimates of the net   22 
gains to programme participants are positive at 1 per cent level using the radius matching 
method.  This  suggests  that  the  household  per  capita  expenditure  of  participating 
households  was  7.3  per  cent  higher  than  what  they  would  have  spend  had  they  not 
participated in commercialisation. 
 
For the regional analysis, it is intriguing to note that estimates from all four matching 
methods  in  the  southern  region  and  consistently  negative  and  highly  significant, 
suggesting  that  commercialisation  has  negative  effects  on  household  per  capita 
expenditure. Results indicate that participating in commercialisation significantly reduces 
household per capita expenditure by between 12.1 per cent and 22.4 per cent. In contrast 
the rest of the regions indicate a positive gain from commercialisation. In the central 
region only the radius matching method is significant at 10 per cent indicating a benefit 
of  6.3  per  cent  in  household  per  capita  expenditure  of  participating  households.  The 
results from the northern region are positive and significant for two matching methods 
(radius  and  kernel  matching  methods).  The  estimates  show  that  households  in  the 
northern  region  spent  between  11.4  per  cent  and  17.4  per  cent  more  on  household 
expenditure per person per day than what they would have spent had they not participated 
in market agriculture.  The major winners from commercialisation were those residing in 
the urban areas where the gains ranged from 23 per cent to 24 per cent. This could be as a 
result of the commercialisation affects household through changes in wages and from 
table 1; households in the urban areas derived a higher proportion of their income from 
employment  (69.2  per  cent  and  53.7  per  cent  for  poor  and  non  poor  households 
respectively).   23 
 
The last section of table 6 analyses the extent to which the livelihood of the vulnerable 
groups, namely female headed and poor households, is affected by commercialisation. 
The estimates indicate that commercialisation generates positive expenditure gains for 
male  headed  households  (8.6  per  cent  more  per  capita  expenditure  than  without 
commercialisation using the radius matching method) while generating negative benefits 
to  female  headed  household  who  experienced  reductions  in  household  per  capita 
expenditure of about 13.5 per cent by participating in commercialisation.(stratification 
matching method). 
 
Similarly,  empirical  results  from  all  matching  methods  indicate  that  poor  households 
experienced reductions in household per capita expenditure of between 11.2 per cent and 
12.5  per  cent  than  what  they  would  have  spend  had  they  not  participated  in 
commercialisation. This contrasts with the gains of between 11.1 per cent and 24.4 per 
cent in household per capita expenditure experienced by non poor households (radius and 




In this article, some of the impacts of commercialisation on households in Malawi have 
been  investigated.  Malawi  is  a  low  income  country,  with  widespread  and  prevalent 
poverty  at  the  national  and  regional  levels.  In  rural  areas,  poverty  is  still  higher.  In 
Malawi, the government and international institutions have long been actively searching   24 
for  programmes  and  policies  to  improve  the  living  standards  of  the  population. 
Concretely, a set of reforms were implemented during the 1990s, including liberalisation, 
privatisation,  and  deregulation  of  marketing  boards  in  agriculture.  After  episodes  of 
economic reforms, households are affected both as consumers and as income earners.  
 
Using  simple  comparison  without  controls,  the  results  indicate  that  overall  those 
household who had participated in commercialisation had a higher welfare indicator than 
the comparators. In terms of regional analysis the southern region and the central region 
results indicate that the participants were actually worse of that non participant.  The 
livelihoods  of  the  most  vulnerable  households  in  Malawi  (female  headed  and  poor 
households) did not benefit from commercialisation.  
 
Using  the  propensity  score  matching  techniques,  we  find  some  evidence  from  radius 
matching that commercialisation leads to higher household per capita expenditure. The 
matching  results  indicate  that  commercialisation  participants  gained  about  7  per  cent 
more household expenditure above what they would have spent had they not participated 
in the commercialisation. 
 
The results from the regional analysis show a reduction in welfare for households in the 
southern region using all four matching methods of between 12 per cent and 22 per cent, 
respectively. In contrast, results for the rest of the regions suggest that commercialisation 
leads to an increase in household per capita expenditure by 6 per cent in the central 
region (radius matching method), increases of between 11 per cent and 17 per cent in the   25 
northern region (radius and kernel matching methods) and between 23 per cent and 24 
per cent in the urban areas (for all four matching methods). These contradictory findings 
can be explained by the differences in the relative contribution of cash crop sales and 
wage employment to the total household income and the average budget shares. The 
southern region has a higher contribution of household income coming from non farm 
businesses (Table 1) than the rest of the rural regions. On the other hand, urban areas 
have the highest contribution to total household income from wage employment for both 
the  urban  poor  and  non  poor.  This  indicates  that  commercialisation  may  not  be 
appropriate in areas where the largest fraction of household expenditure is spent on food 
and the largest impacts of trade policies and economic reforms do not affect changes in 
the prices of food items because expenditures on other non-food items are relatively less 
important in terms of total expenditure, the welfare impacts being lower as a result. 
 
In  spite  of  the  contrasting  evidence  across  the  areas,  it  is  intriguing  to  find  strong 
evidence that the livelihood of women would have worsened in due to commercialisation. 
Results indicate that female headed household participants reduced their household per 
capita expenditure by 14 per cent due to commercialisation. The finding underscores the 
need for designing gender-focused economic reform programmes.  
 
Finally,  results  from  matching  techniques  indicate  that  poor  households’  per  capita 
expenditure is between 11 per cent and 13 per cent less than what it would have been had 
they not participated in commercialisation. 
   26 
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Table 1: Sources of Household income (percentage) 
      National          
Southern 
Region       
Central 
Region       
Northern 
Region       
Urban 
Region 
   Total   Poor 
Non-
poor     Total   poor 
non-
poor     Total   Poor 
non-
poor     Total   poor 
non-
poor     Total   poor 
non-
poor 
Net food crop sales*  -0.6   -0.5   - 0.6    
               
0.9  
               
1.6  
               
0.7     - 2.2   -2.2   -2.2    
              
0.1   - 0.5  
              
0.5     -0.5   -1.0   -0.4  
Net cash crop sales* 
               
5.1  
               
6.7  
               
4.5    
               
1.1  
               
2.0  
               
0.9    
              
9.0  
            
10.7  
              
8.3    
              
5.1  
             
5.9  
              
4.7    
              
1.0  
              
0.2  
              
1.1  
Net livestock and 
products sales* 
               
1.3  
               
1.8  
               
1.0    
               
0.9  
               
1.5  
               
0.7    
              
1.3  
              
1.8  
              
1.0    
              
2.4  
              
2.4  
              
2.5    
              
0.1  
              
0.2  
               
0.0   
Net non farm business 
sales* 
               
8.2  
               
2.3  
             
10.5    
      
16.9  
               
2.8  
             
21.4    
              
1.6  
              
2.1  
              
1.4    
              
1.4  
              
1.7  
              
1.1    
            
21.4  
              
8.1  
            
23.6  
Employment income 
             
28.2  
             
21.5  
             
30.9    
             
31.2  
             
27.1  
             
32.4    
            
26.6  
            
16.8  
            
30.7    
            
24.2  
            
22.1  
            
25.5    
            
55.8  
            
69.2  
       
53.7  
In-kind income 
               
2.7  
               
1.5  
               
3.2    
               
1.9  
               
2.0  
               
1.8    
              
4.0  
              
1.3  
              
5.2    
              
1.1  
              
0.9  
           
1.2    
              
5.0  
              
0.8  
              
5.7  
Interest income 
               
0.7  
               
0.1  
               
1.0    
               
1.3  
               
0.1  
               
1.6    
              
0.4  
              
0.1  
             
0.5    
               
0.0   
               
0.0   
              
0.1    
              
1.7  
              
0.2  
              
1.9  
Rental income 
               
1.5  
               
1.0  
               
1.6    
               
1.3  
               
1.2  
            
1.3    
              
1.8  
              
1.3  
              
2.0    
              
1.0  
              
0.2  
              
1.5    
              
3.0  
              
3.6  
              
2.9  
Other income 
               
4.4  
               
3.5  
               
4.8    
               
3.7  
               
1.2  
               
4.6    
              
4.3  
              
4.0  
              
4.4    
              
7.2  
              
7.0  
              
7.3    
              
4.8  
              
2.5  




               
5.3  
               
6.2  
               
5.0    
               
4.8  
               
6.3  
               
4.3    
              
3.7  
              
4.1  
              
3.6    
            
12.7  
            
11.4  
            
13.5    
              
3.4  
              
4.6  
              
3.2  
Value of home 
production consumed 
             
43.2  
             
55.9  
             
38.1    
             
36.0  
             
54.2  
             
30.3    
            
49.6  
            
60.0  
            
45.1    
        
44.7  
            
48.9  
            
42.2    
              
4.3  
            
11.8  
              
3.1  
 
              
100  
              
100  
              
100    
              
100  
              
100  
              
100    
             
100  
             
100  
             
100    
             
100  
             
100  
             
100    
             
100  
             
100  
             
100  
Total per capita daily 
income (MK)  10.39  4.96  18.39     9.39  3.66  18.65     11.01  5.80  17.80     12.34  7.69  19.76     31.69  8.56  55.57 
*Net sales are calculated as the difference between total sales and total costs (for inputs or other costs) except for net food crop sales which does not represent the difference 
between sales and purchases of food crops 
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Table 2: Average Budget Shares (percentage) 
    National    Southern Region 
 
Central Region  
  
Northern Region    Urban Region 
   Total   poor 
non-
poor    Total   poor 
Non-
poor    Total   poor 
non-
poor    Total   Poor 
non-
poor    Total   poor 
non-
poor 
Food     61.5  
   
76.0  
   
55.4        59.2  
   
74.4  
   
52.5        62.9  
   
78.4  
   
57.0        65.0  
   
74.3  
   
59.8        35.2  
   
57.5  
   
29.8  
Fuels       3.7  
     
4.3  
     
3.4          3.3  
     
4.1  
     
3.0          4.1  
     
5.3  
     
3.7          3.1  
     
2.4  
     
3.5          3.9  
     
7.7  
     
3.0  
Clothing       6.6  
     
5.2  
     
7.2          6.2  
     
4.7  
     
6.8          6.4  
     
4.9  
     
7.0          8.9  
     
7.6  
     
9.6          6.7  
     
5.5  
     
7.0  
Education        3.2  
     
1.7  
     
3.8          3.8  
     
1.7  
     
4.7          2.6  
     
1.3  
     
3.2          2.8  
     
2.8  
     
2.8          6.3  
     
1.7  
     
7.5  
Health       1.3  
     
1.1  
     
1.3          1.7  
     
1.2  
     
1.9          1.0  
     
1.0  
     
1.0          0.8  
     
0.9  
     
0.7          2.3  
     
2.2  
     
2.4  
Household consumer 
durables       3.4  
     
2.1  
     
3.9          3.6  
     
2.2  
     
4.2          2.9  
     
1.9  
     
3.3          4.0  
     
2.7  
     
4.7          4.1  
     
2.8  
     
4.4  
Housing and repairs       7.8  
     
3.0  
     
9.8          9.3  
     
4.3  
   
11.6          7.3  
     
2.0  
     
9.4          3.6  
     
1.7  
     
4.5        19.5  
   
11.2  
   
21.4  
Travel related       2.2  
     
0.8  
     
2.8          2.1  
     
1.0  
     
2.6          2.5  
     
0.6  
     
3.2          1.5  
     
1.0  
     
1.8          4.4  
     
1.8  
     
5.1  
Gifts, transfers, or 
loans       5.1  
     
2.0  
     
6.4          5.1  
     
2.6  
     
6.2          5.2  
     
1.5  
     
6.5          4.7  
     
1.6  
     
6.4          8.4  
     
4.2  
     
9.4  
Investment related       1.0  
     
0.3  
     
1.3          0.7  
     
0.2  
     
0.9          1.2  
     
0.3  
     
1.5          1.1  
     
0.6  
     
1.4          2.2  
     
0.9  
     
2.5  
Personal goods       2.7  
     
3.0  
     
2.6          3.0  
     
3.0  
     
2.9          2.6  
     
2.4  
     
2.6          3.3  
     
3.5  
     
3.4          3.0  
     
3.3  
    
2.9  
Other       1.5  
     
0.5  
     
2.1          2.0  
     
0.6  
     
2.7          1.3  
     
0.4  
     
1.6          1.2  
     
0.9  
     
1.4          4.0  
     
1.2  
     
4.6    32 
Table 3: Average per capita household expenditure differentials in Malawi Kwacha 
(MK) 


















































































































































Notes:  MP  =Market  participants;  NP=non-programme  participants;  *P<0.10,  **P<0.05, 
***P<0.001; Stars indicate that the means are statistically different between participants and non-
participants.   33
Table 4: Estimates of expenditure gains from commercialisation (Ln per capita daily expenditure in Malawi Kwacha) 
Nearest neighbour  Radius Matching  Kernel Matching  Stratification  ATE  
nT  nC  ATE  S.E.  nT  nC  ATE  S.E.  nT  nC  ATE  S.E.  nT  nC  ATE  S.E 
                                   
Full sample  2307  1159  -0.011  0.051  2307  4026  0.073***  0.019  2307  4026  0.013  0.039  2307  4026  0.002  0.042 
Regional Analysis                                 
Southern Region  737  499  -0.224***  0.042  737  1591  -0.121***  0.032  737  1591  -0.187***  0.039  737  1608  -0.216***  0.040 
Central Region  547  410  -0.025  0.056  547  1811  0.063*  0.034  547  1811  -0.011  0.036  547  1811  -0.035  0.043 
Northern Region   277  180  0.058  0.078  277  522  0.174***  0.054  277  522  0.114**  0.058  276  533  0.099  0.070 
Urban Regions  746  71  0.199  0.140  746  75  0.247**  0.107  746  75  0.229**  0.111  746  75  0.228**  0.114 
Gender Analysis                                 
Male Headed   1885  909  0.005  0.065  1885  2902  0.086***  0.020  1885  2902  0.045  0.042  1885  2902  0.039  0.050 
Female Headed  422  242  -0.162  0.113  422  1124  -0.017  0.045  422  1124  -0.077  0.076  408  1138  -0.135*  0.080 
Poverty Analysis                                 
Non poor 
Households 
1101  461  0.112  0.087  1101  1840  0.244***  0.017  1101  1840  0.111*  0.064  1101  1840  0.087  0.065 
Poor Households  1206  678  -0.125***  0.024  1206  2185  -0.114***  0.014  1206  2185  -0.112***  0.019  1206  2186  -0.112***  0.020 
ATE=‘average treatment effect’; S.E.-bootstrapped standard errors;*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively. 
 nT=number of treated, nC= number of controls  
 